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Abstract—Vehicle-to-grid (V2G) networks have emerged as a
new technology in modern electric power transmission networks.
It allows bi-directional flow of communication and electricity
between electric vehicles (EVs) and the Smart Grid (SG), in
order to provide more sophisticated energy trading. However,
due to the involvement of a huge amount of trading data and
the presence of untrusted entities in the visiting networks, the
underlying V2G infrastructure suffers from various security
and privacy challenges. Although, several solutions have been
proposed in the literature to address these problems, issues
like lack of mutual authentication and anonymity, incapability
to protect against several attack vectors, generation of huge
overhead, and dependency on centralized infrastructures make
security and privacy issues even more challenging. To address the
above mentioned problems, in this paper, we propose a blockchain
oriented hierarchical authentication mechanism for rewarding
EVs. The overall process is broadly classified into the following
phases: 1) System Initialization, 2) Registration, 3) Hierarchical
Mutual Authentication, and 4) Consensus; wherein blockchain’s
distributed ledger has been employed for transaction execution in
distributed V2G environments while Elliptic curve cryptography
(ECC) has been used for hierarchical authentication. The designed
hierarchical authentication mechanism has been employed to
preserve the anonymity of EVs and support mutual authentication
between EVs, charging stations (CSs) and the central aggregator
(CAG). Additionally, it also supports minimal communicational
and computational overheads on resource constrained EVs. Fur-
ther, formal security verification of the proposed scheme on widely
accepted Automated Validation of Internet Security Protocols and
Applications (AVISPA) tool validates its safeness against different
security attacks.
Index Terms—Blockchain, Charging stations, Electric vehicles,
Elliptic curve cryptography, Energy trading, Hierarchical authen-
tication, and Vehicle to grid
I. INTRODUCTION
With the rapid proliferation of Information and Commu-
nication Technologies (ICT), smart grids (SGs) are gaining
tremendous attention. It uses bi-directional flow of infor-
mation and electrical energy to create an intelligent and
widely distributed automated energy networks. As an important
component, Vehicle-to-Grid (V2G) networks have emerged,
wherein electric vehicles (EVs) interacts with SGs, especially
for energy trading. Here, EVs with surplus energy perform
charge and discharge operations in order to balance the power
demand of SGs [1]. However, due to the association of vehicle
mobility, charging and discharging operations, and limited
communication range, the information shared across EVs and
other V2G entities face significant security and privacy risks.
Thus, EVs, which play a key role in energy transportation
and management, may not be willing to participate in energy
trading. In order to encourage EVs in energy trade-off, it is
prevalent to design a secure, efficient, and reliable authentica-
tion mechanism for energy trading in V2G setups.
Recently, several cryptographic schemes based on authenti-
cation, physical layer protection, and encryption have been pro-
posed for SGs. For example, Odelu et al. [2] proposed a secure
authenticated key agreement scheme for SG, which provides
privacy and session-key security under the Canetti-Krawczyk
adversary model. Eiza et al. [3] designed an efficient, secure
and privacy-preserving proxy mobile IPv6 (PMIPv6) protocol
to address the security and privacy concerns of mobile IP
communications in V2G networks. In a similar direction, Wu et
al. [4] utilized elliptic curve cryptography (ECC) to propose a
secure and lightweight agreement mechanism for SG. In order
to assure the confidentiality and integrity of V2G connections,
Abdallah and Shen [5] designed a lightweight authentication
and privacy-preserving scheme where EVs are allowed to gen-
erate their own pseudonym identities for protecting their private
information. Likewise, Kumar et al. [6] designed a hybrid
cryptography based authentication and key agreement scheme
to facilitate mutual trust between the legitimate entities in smart
energy networks. In order to provision the authentication be-
tween EVs and smart meters, Wazid et al. [7] devised a three-
factor user authentication scheme for SG environments based
on lightweight cryptographic primitives such as one-way hash
functions, bitwise XOR operations and ECC. Similarly, Gope
and Sikdar [8] used physically uncloneable functions and one-
way hash functions to develop a privacy-aware authenticated
key agreement scheme for SG communications. In order to
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address the security and privacy issues in the V2G networks,
Shen et al. [9] proposed a robust key agreement protocol by
leveraging hash functions and bitwise exclusive-OR operations.
Although several authentication schemes have been pro-
posed, most of them are deemed unfit for resource constrained
V2G setups since they depend on public-key cryptosystems,
cannot ensure security against insider attacks, lacks anonymity,
incur high communication and computation costs, and more-
over suffer from problems like single point of failure and
privacy leakage [10]. In order to support an adequate level
of security in V2G setups, a promising blockchain technology
has been introduced because of its high potential to support de-
centralization, anonymity, trust, and integrity, with a moderate
cost. It is a peer-to-peer (P2P) distributed ledger technology
that maintains transactional data across several systems in a
verifiable and permanent manner. It adopts multiple means such
as data encryption, automated scripts, distributed consensus,
time stamping, and economic incentives in order to improve the
security, intelligence, storage, and management while solving
the problems of high costs and inefficiency, that are common
in traditional centralized energy trading systems.
In this direction, several authors used blockchain for solving
the security and privacy concerns in decentralized SG environ-
ments. For example, Guan et al. [11] proposed a blockchain
based privacy-preserving and data aggregation scheme for
secure communications in SG, where Bloom filter was adopted
to realize the fast authentication. Likewise, Wang et al. [12]
designed an efficient anonymous rewarding scheme which em-
ploys digital signature, ring signature, encryption, blockchain,
and Monero to satisfy the security requirements of V2G
networks. In a similar direction, Liu et al. [13] devised a cross-
domain authentication scheme, where consortium blockchain
and SM9, an identity-based cryptographic algorithm, was em-
ployed to provide the required level of security and privacy
in V2G networks. In order to address the security and privacy
challenges caused by untrusted parties, Li et al. [14] proposed a
consortium blockchain based solution for secure energy trading
in Industrial Internet of Things (IIoT). Moreover, they also
proposed a credit-based payment scheme to support a fast and
frequent P2P trading of energy; wherein Stackelberg game was
used to decide the optimal pricing strategy. Similarly, Kang
et al. [15] also deployed a consortium blockchain technology
to address the security and privacy issues in P2P energy
trading among EVs. Likewise, Aitzhan and Svetinovic [16] also
addressed the security and privacy issues of energy trading data
using blockchain, multi-signatures, and anonymous message
propagation streams. Although several schemes have been
proposed in the literature, they may not work well due to the
lack of mutual authentication between a communicating parties
and inability to preserve their anonymity. Thus, in this paper
we employ a combination of ECC and blockchain for secure
and anonymous energy trading in V2G setups.
A. Contributions
Key contributions of this research work are illustrated below:
• We present an effective blockchain based hierarchical
authentication mechanism for secure and anonymous en-
ergy trading in V2G setups. Here, blockchain’s distributed
ledger is employed for transaction execution in distributed
V2G environments while ECC is used for hierarchical
authentication.
• The hierarchical authentication mechanism has been de-
signed to preserve the anonymity of EVs and support
mutual authentication between the EVs, charging stations
(CSs) and central aggregator (CAG). Additionally, it also
supports minimal communicational and computational
overheads on resource constrained EVs.
• We also justify the performance of the proposed scheme
on the widely acceptable AVISPA tool and establish the
reduced burden on EVs for participating in secure V2G
energy trading mechanism.
B. Organization
The rest of the manuscript is structured in accordance with
the following sequence: Section II presents the high level
description of the proposed system model followed by the
proposed scheme in Section III. The detailed security analysis
of the proposed scheme along with extensive performance
assessment are presented in Section IV. Finally, Section V
concludes the proposed work.
II. SYSTEM MODEL
This section illustrates the high level view of the considered
V2G scenario with different entities helping in forming and
maintaining the distributed ledger.
Fig. 1 depicts the systematic diagram of the proposed
scheme with different components of the considered ecosystem
and their corresponding execution steps. As evidenced from the
figure, the considered setup is comprised of four core entities
namely-EVs, CSs, CAG, and the blockchain network. The fleet
of EVs are distributed energy sources that help in maintaining
the SG’s stability either by injecting or withdrawing energy
from the grid. These V2G services help in stabilizing the
SG’s operations in both peak and off-peak hours. Hence, SG
imparts incentives to the EVs for participating in the regulatory
process. On the other hand the EVs’ charge and discharge their
respective batteries at dedicated charging points available at the
CS level. These CSs are equipped with smart meters (to keep
track of the amount of energy withdrawn/injected) and record
the current electricity prices. Thus, CSs know the amount of
rewards that needs to be paid to an EV for participating in
the regulatory mechanism and is responsible for generating
the related transactions. Above all, the CAG is the central
authority that validates the transactions created by CSs and
maintains the entire blockchain network (with the help of CSs).
Additionally, it is also responsible for registering legitimate a
nd illegitimate EVs and CSs. Here, the blockchain network
helps in transmitting the rewards to designated EVs in a secure
and anonymous manner.
The foremost step in the proposed V2G energy-trading
process is the system initialization wherein CAG releases the
public parameters for implementing the cryptographic func-
tions. In the next step, EVs and CSs register themselves with
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Fig. 1: Systematic diagram of the proposed scheme.
the CAG and obtain their respective pseudo identity. These
identities of EVs correspond to their address on the global
ledger. Additionally, the CAG is also responsible for generating
public-private key pairs for all EVs, CSs and itself. For secure
energy trading, the CSs accept an EV’s request to participate
post successful mutual authentication between itself, the EV
and the CAG. Once the authenticity is established, the CS
provides charging/discharging services to the designated EV
and generates the corresponding reward results. The results
are transferred to the CAG which verifies the transaction and
writes a block to the ledger using the practical byzantine fault
tolerance (PBFT) mechanism. With consensus establishment,
the reward is transferred to the designated EV and a receipt is
sent to the EV by the CS.
III. PROPOSED SCHEME
The overall process of blockchain based hierarchical au-
thentication mechanism for rewarding EVs can be broadly
classified into the following phases: 1) System Initialization,
2) Registration, 3) Hierarchical Mutual Authentication, and
4) Consensus. The detailed information about these phases is
summarized as follows:
Phase 1: System Initialization Phase
During this phase, the CAG prepares the V2G environment
for subsequent phases as follows:
Step 1: The CAG selects an elliptic curve E with base point
P and a large prime number n.
Step 2: Using the above parameters, the CAG generates its
private key SKAD ∈ Z∗p . Following this, the CAG employ
a ECC multiplicative operation over SKCAG to generate its
public key as follows: PKCAG = SKCAG.P .
Step 3: The CAG publishes all the public parameters including:
E, p, n, PKCAG, and the one-way collision resistant hash
function H(.).
Phase 2: Registration
This phase involves the registration of the legitimate EVs
and CSs at the CAG level over a secure channel. The process
of registering an EV and a CS is identical. Hence, this sub-
section elaborates the registration process for the ith EV. The
pictorial representation of this process can be found in Fig. 2.
EV i CAG
-Selects TDEVi
-Generates time stamp TEVi
-Computes TK0 = {TDEVi ||TEVi}
<TK0> over secure channel−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→
-Extracts TDEVi and TEVi from TK0
-Validates TEVi
-Check the availability of TDEVi in
its repository
-Allocates unique Id TDEVi to EV
-Generates a random secret key (SKEVi )
-Computes its public key PKEVi = SKEVi .P
-Computes PTDEVi = H(SKEVi ||TDEVi )
-Stores PTDEVi and PKEVi
<PTDEVi
,PKEVi ,SKEVi> over secure channel←−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−
-Saves PTDEVi , and SKEVi
Fig. 2: An illustration of the EV’s registration process.
Step 1: EV i selects an identity TDEVi for uniquely presenting
itself. This identity could be EV’s license number or it vehicle
identification number issued by the auto-mobile company.
Next, the EV generates the current time stamp TEVi and
computes the token TK0 = {TDEVi ||TEVi}.
Step 2: The value of the token TK0 is then transmitted to the
CAG over the secure channel.
Step 3: Upon receiving the token value, the CAG extracts
TDEVi and TEVi . Following this, it validates the time stamp
and proceeds further only if it is within the permissible range.
Step 4: The CAG verifies the existence of TDEVi in its
repository and revocation list. A match found in its repository
indicates that the ith EV has been registered earlier. On the
other hand, a match in the revocation list denotes that the EV
is illegitimate and should not be registered. In either cases, the
connection is terminated.
Step 5: In this step, the CAG accepts the EV’s request for
registration and generates a public-private key pair (PKEVi &
SKEVi ) for it using ECC.
Step 6: The CAG also computes a pseudo identity for the ith
EV as follows: PTDEVi = H(SKEVi ||TDEVi . Finally, the
computed keys and pseudo identity are trasmitted to the EV
over the secure channel.
Step 7: The CAG stores the PTDEVi and PKEVi values; while
EV stores the PTDEVi and SKEVi values.
Phase 3: Hierarchical Mutual Authentication
During this phase, the ith EV mutually authenticates the
CAG using the jth CS before commencing any transaction. The
proposed authentication mechanism relies on inexpensive ECC,
one-way hash functions, and concatenation operations, and is
referred to as the hierarchical authentication mechanism. The
detailed execution process is illustrated in Fig. 3 and described
in detail as follows:
Step 1: This phase is initiated by the CSj , moment EVi
connects to the charging point at the CS and begins to charge
EV i CS j CAG
-Select a random number r1 ∈ Z∗p
-Generate time stamp TCSj
-Compute R1 = r1.P
-Compute M1 =< R1||PTDCSj ||TCSj >
M1=<R1||PTDCSj ||TCSj>←−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−
-Extract R1, PTDCSj and TCSj
Validate TCSj
-Compute R2 = SKEVi .R1
-Generate time stamp TEVi
-Compute AuthEVi−CSj = H(R1||R2||PTDEVi ||PTDCSj ||TEVi )
-Compute AuthEVi−CAG = H(R1||R2||PTDEVi ||PTDCAG||TEVi )
M2=<AuthEVi−CSj , AuthEVi−CAG, TEVi , PTDEVi>−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→
-Validate time stamp TEVi
-Compute Auth∗EVi−CSj = H(R1||r1.PKEVi ||PTDEVi ||PTDCSj ||TEVi )
-Check Auth∗EVi−CSj
?
= AuthEVi−CSj
-If same, EV i is marked authentic; else tear down the connection
-Select a random number r2 ∈ Z∗p
-Compute R3 = r2.P
-Compute R4 = SKCSj .R3
-Generate time stamp TCSj
-Compute AuthCSj−CAG = H(R3||PTDCSj ||PTDCAG||TCSj ||AuthEVi−CAG)
M3=<AuthCSj−CAG, TCSj , TEVi , r1, r2, R1, PTDEVi , PTDCSj>−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→
-Validate time stamp TEVi and TCSj
-Compute Auth∗EVi−CAGj =
H(R1||r1.PKEVi ||PTDEVi ||PTDCAG||TEVi )
-Compute Auth∗CSj−CAG = H(r2.PKCSj ||PTDCSj ||PTDCAG||
TCSj ||Auth∗EVi−CAG)
-Check Auth∗CSj−CAG
?
= AuthCSj−CAG
-If same, jth CS and ith EV are marked authentic; else connection
terminated
-Generate time stamp TCAG
-Compute R5 = SKCAG.R1
-Compute AuthCAG = H(R5||PTDEVi ||PTDCSj ||PTDCAG||TCAG)
M4=<AuthCAG, TCAG>←−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−
-Validate time stamp TCAG
-Compute Auth∗CAG = H(r1.PKCAG||PTDEVi ||PTDCSj ||PTDCAG||TCAG)
-Check Auth∗CAG
?
= AuthCAG
-If same, CAG is marked authentic; else tear down the connection
M5=<AuthCAG, TCAG, r1>←−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−
-Validate time stamp TCAG
-Compute Auth∗CAG = H(r1.PKCAG||PTDEVi ||PTDCSj ||PTDCAG||TCAG)
-Check Auth∗CAG
?
= AuthCAG
-If same, CAG is marked authentic; else tear down the connection
Fig. 3: An illustration of the proposed mutual authentication phase based on hierarchical approach.
or discharge its battery for effective demand response and
ancillary services. In order to initiate the process, the CS
selects a random number r1 ∈ Z∗p and generates a time
stamp TCSj . Subsequently, it computes R1 = r1.P using ECC
multiplicative operation over r1 and P . Finally, the jth CS
generates the first message M1 =< R1||PTDCSj ||TCSj >
and relays the same to the ith EV for further processing.
Step 2: On receiving M1, the ith EV extracts the pseudo
identity of the jth CS (PTDCSj ) along with R1 and TCSj .
It then validates TCSj if it is within the permissible time
frame. Using this, the EV computes R2 = SKEVi .R1
using its private key SKEVi and received R1. Next,
it generates the time stamp TEVi and computes two
tokens for authenticating the jth CS (AuthEVi−CSj =
H(R1||R2||PTDEVi ||PTDCSj ||TEVi)) and the CAG
(AuthEVi−CAG = H(R1||R2||PTDEVi ||PTDCAG||TEVi)),
respectively.
Step 3: Finally, the ith transmits the message
M2 to the jth CS with the following tokens
< AuthEVi−CSj , AuthEVi−CAG, TEVi , PTDEVi >.
Step 4: The jth CS initiates the process to check the authen-
ticity of the ith EV as follows. Initially, its validates the time
stamp TEVi and proceeds only if its within the permissible
time window. Next, it computes the intermediate authentication
token Auth∗EVi−CSj and compares its value with the received
token AuthEVi−CSj . A matched value establishes the authen-
ticity of the ith EV and a mismatch indicates a malicious entity
leading to connection termination.
Step 5: In the former scenario, the CS continues with the
authentication process and proceeds with generating an au-
thentication token for the CAG as follows. Firstly, it gen-
erates a random number r2 ∈ Z∗p and then computes R3
and R4. Next, it generates the time stamp TCSj and using
the above mentioned values computes a token for CAG to
authenticate the CSs AuthCSj−CAG. Its values is equiv-
alent to H(R3||PTDCSj ||PTDCAG||TCSj ||AuthEVi−CAG).
It is worth mentioning here that this token also encapsu-
lates the authentication token for the CAG transmitted by
the ith EV. Finally, the CS transmits message M3 to the
CAG with AuthCSj−CAG, TCSj , TEVi , r1, r2, R1, PTDEVi ,
and PTDCSj tokens.
Step 6: In response to the received message, the CAG initially
validates the TEVi and TCSj . It next computes the intermediate
authentication tokens Auth∗CSj−CAG and Auth
∗
CSj−CAG. Fi-
nally, it cross verifies the correctness of Auth∗CSj−CAG against
AuthCSj−CAG. Identical values, establish the authenticity of
both the ith EV and jth CS, and the process proceeds further;
otherwise the connection is terminated.
Step 7: In this step, the CAG generates a token for the ith EV
and jth CS, referred as AuthCAG using time stamp TCAG and
token R5 = SKCAG.R1. Next it relays the message M4 =<
AuthCAG, TCAG > to the CS.
Step 8: The CS then validates the received time stamp and
correctness of the authentication token Auth∗CAG. Valid result
prove the authentication of the CAG and the received token
are then transmitted to the EVi for further processing along
with r1.
Step 9: The ith EV repeats the above process and mutually
validates the authenticity of the CAG with the received token.
Phase 4: Consensus Mechanism
The proposed secure and anonymous energy trading mech-
anism employ the advantages of the PBFT consensus mech-
anism for maintaining the global ledger. The transaction of
reward to the participating EVs from the utility is accomplished
in accordance with the following steps:
Step 1: In the considered V2G scenario, it is assumed that the
CSs are equipped with sufficient computational and commu-
nicational resources; wherein CSs have the ability to write a
block to the ledger.
Step 2: Let us assume, a total of n CSs are registered with the
CAG. Amongst these CSs, one is selected as the “Speaker”
and rest are marked as “Congressmen”. The primary role of
the “Speaker” is to organise the consensus mechanism while
staying away from the voting process involved in consensus.
The selected speaker is liable to conduct consensus for ap-
proximately m turns. The selection of the speaker amongst
the n available CS candidates is based on the following rule:
x = (h mod m) + 1. Here, the variables x and m refer to the
selected speaker and height of the current block, respectively.
Step 3: After successful authentication and availing V2G
services, the jth CS relays the transaction details to the
CAG; which then broadcast the details to all the CSs on the
blockchain network. The CSs then store the transaction details
in their respective memories prior to transferring them to the
ledger.
Step 4: Post t time intervals, the block containing the transac-
tion details is created which then undergoes the voting process
carried out by the speaker. In the initial run, the speaker request
congressmen to cast their votes.
Step 5: Following this, the congressmen casts their respective
votes. On the basis of the received response from congressmen,
the speaker reaches a consensus to finally publish the block
with the transaction details on the global ledger.
IV. RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
In this section, the performance of the proposed scheme is
extensively assessed in terms of different evaluation metrics
such as security features support, formal security verification,
and computational and communicational overhead analysis.
The detailed description is mentioned as follows.
A. Security feature evaluation
The proposed blockchain based hierarchical authentication
mechanism supports the following security features: mutual au-
thentication, anonymity of CSs, EVs and CAG, unforgeability,
unlinkability and limited operations for the EVs. Further, it also
provides replay protection with forward secrecy and prevents
identity spoofing.
B. Formal security verification
In order to validate the safeness of the designed hierar-
chical authentication protocol (as detailed in Phase 3 of the
proposed scheme), it has been subjected to an open source
suite of applications named AVISPA. The tool is extensively
used by the research community to validate and verify the
security goals of any designed protocol against a rich source
of attack vectors provided by AVISPA’s back-ends namely-on
the fly model checker (OFMC), CL-based attack searcher (CL-
AtSe), SAT-based model checker (SATMC), and tree automata-
based protocol analyzer (TA4SP). Additionally, AVISPA is also
employed to trace any security flaw in the designed protocol
and devise different methods to remove it. Further, AVISPA
accepts the input in the form of a role-based language known
as high level protocol specification language (HLPSL). Using
this language, the different entities involved in the designed
protocol are expressed as different roles which interact amongst
each other to trigger different transactions. For instance, in
the considered scheme, EVs, CSs and CAG were portrayed as
different roles and the execution flow, as depicted in Fig. 3, as
different transactions. The result of executing these transactions
on OFMC and CL-AtSe back-ends lead to the “Safe” results
as shown in Fig. 4. This clearly indicates that the proposed
hierarchical authentication mechanism based on blockchain is
safe to be executed on real-time test beds.
C. Analysis of Computation and Communication Overhead
In this section, we analysis the computational and communi-
cation overhead across the three entities involved in the mutual
authentication process based on hierarchical approach. It is
evident from the description given in Section III that EVs,
CSs and CAG participate in hierarchical authentication for
mutually authenticating each other before the services could
be availed/provided by the EVs and rewards could be granted
in return. In the overall process, the considered entities incur
computational and communicational expenses. Hence, this sec-
tion elaborates the same in detail. The computational expenses
% OFMC
% Version of 2006/02/13
SUMMARY
SAFE
DETAILS
BOUNDED NUMBER OF
SESSIONS PROTOCOL
/home/span/Hierarchical.if
GOAL
as specified
BACKEND
OFMC
COMMENTS
STATISTICS
parseTime: 0.00s
searchTime: 0.32s
visitedNodes: 40 nodes
depth: 4 plies
SUMMARY
SAFE
DETAILS
BOUNDED NUMBER OF
SESSIONS TYPED MODEL
PROTOCOL
/home/span/Hierarchical.if
GOAL
As Specified
BACKEND
CL-AtSe
STATISTICS
Analysed : 0 states
Reachable : 0 states
Translation: 0.24 seconds
Computation: 0.00 seconds
Fig. 4: Evaluation of mutual authentication based on
hierarchical approach on AVISPA.
incurred by the EVs, CSs and CAG could be attributed to the
number of cryptographic operations performed in the overall
process. Here, the most significant operation encompasses
ECC multiplication (ECM) operations followed by one-way
hash (Hash) operations. Fig. 5 depicts the relative comparison
between the chosen entities on the basis of number of ECM
and Hash operations. It is evident from the obtained results that
the least number of cryptographic operations are executed by
the resource constrained EVs and computationally busy CAG
followed by the CS.
#(ECM) #(Hash) #(Tokens)
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Fig. 5: Overhead analysis.
On the other hand, the communication overhead is expressed
in terms of the number of incoming tokens. The higher the
number of incoming tokens, the higher is the communicational
cost. The related results have been highlighted in Fig. 5 which
clearly indicate that the EVs experience the least communica-
tion overhead followed by CS and then by CAG. Thus, it can
be summarized that the designed hierarchical authentication
mechanism not only guarantees enhanced security support but
also imposes less overheads on the battery powered EVs.
V. CONCLUSION
With the increasing penetration of EVs in SG scenarios,
distributed V2G services have witnessed a major blow in the
last couple of years. Recent research statistics indicate that the
efficient use of a fleet of EVs is detrimental in managing grid
fluctuations. Towards this end, the need to design an efficient
and secure energy trading mechanism is of utmost importance.
Thus, in this paper, we proposed a blockchain based hierar-
chical authentication mechanism; wherein the global ledger
helps in the secure and anonymous dispatch of rewards to the
participating EVs. On the other hand, the proposed hierarchical
mechanism helps establish the mutual authenticity of EVs, CSs
and the CAG and is a novel attempt in this direction. Further,
the obtained results indicate that the proposed mechanism is
suitable for V2G scenarios and is apt for resource constrained
EVs as it leads to reduced communicational and computational
expenses.
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